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THE COLONIAL STATE AND
CAPITALIST EXPANSION
IN PUERTO RICO
Pedro A. Cabän
On January 19th of this year
the leaders of Puerto Rico's
three electoral parties signed
an historic statement calling
upon President Bush to begin a
process leading to the final
resolution of Puerto Rico's
political status. 1 This is the
only occasion in recent history
in which the Island's political
leadership has made a unified
public declaration calling for a
revision of the Commonwealth
status. It represents the
prevailing view among U.S. and
Puerto Rican policy makers
that the colonial relationship is
seriously deficient. While the
accord among the Island's
political leaders is relatively
novel, the issue of the colonial
state's long term capacity to
manage the local political
economy in the interests of the
United States has been the
subject of academic and
government studies.
By 1975 it was fairly
obvious that Puerto Rico's
post-war model of economic
growth, which was associated
with marked social gains, was
exhausted. In that year the
Committee to Study Puerto
Rico's Finances presented its
sobering analysis of the local
economy. 2 The Committee,
whose recommendations presaged
the supply side dogma of the
Reagan administration,
emphasized eliminating
regulations which impeded
corporate profitability and a
substantially diminished state
role in providing basic social
services. The Committee
endorsed the orthodox palliative
that vibrant economic growth
would increase the aggregate
social wage and result in the
overall material improvement of
society. By 1975 it was
apparent that capitalist growth
was transforming Puerto Rico's
position in the international
division of labor, and with it
the colonial state's role in
material and social reproduction.
Puerto Rico's post-war
industrialization policy succeeded
in large part because it could
guarantee greater profitability
than competing regional
manufacturing centers in the
U.S. But by the late 1970s,
planning strategy was altered in
response to the investment
needs of multinational
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corporations. Puerto Rico was
no longer competing solely with
decaying regions in the
mainland, but with the newly
industrializing economies.
Policy planners had to devise
more profitable investment
schemes to attract these
globally oriented firms.
Puerto Rico's changing role
in the world economy had at
least three serious implications
for the Island's traditional
growth model. After the mid-
1970s, Puerto Rico could not
attract industries with a low
capital to labor ratio, and
opted to promote firms that did
not require cheap labor to
realize acceptable profits. The
new firms were in service,
finance and high tech
production. In order to
enhance Puerto Rico's global
appeal, new firms were not
expected to employ socially
appropriate technologies in the
conduct of their activities.
Second, the federal government
took a central role in providing
for the needs of an expanding
population that was excluded
from the benefits of growth.
While the colonial state
preserved the institutional and
financial conditions necessary
for investments and
profitability, a greater share of
the socialized costs of
reproduction was absorbed by
the metropolitan state.3
Finally, planners called for
dismantling anachronistic
restrictions imposed by
colonialism so the colonial
state could have the flexibility
to ad just to the impulsive
character of advanced capital.4
These developments suggest
that under the prevailing
colonial relation the colonial
state can not adequately
manage the conflicting
requirements of capital and
labor. To understand the
current situation, which is one
of the declining efficacy of the
colonial state to promote
accumulation and sustain the
legitimacy of colonial rule, it is
necessary to develop an
historical account of the state's
evolution and function.
A comprehensive historical
account should address the
following: The colonial state's
degree of autonomy from the
metropolitan state to influence
the trajectory of capitalist
development; its ability to ad just
to the changing requirements of
foreign capital; the forces that
determine the nature and
substance of the colonial state's
intervention in the political
economy; and the nature of
colonial state and class relations
and its relations with the
domestic capitalist class.
There are five distinct
periods in the evolution of the
colonial state from its inception
in 1898 through the past year.5
The periods and their definable
characteristics are: (1) formation
of the colonial state apparatus
(1898-1917); (2) consolidation
and demise of the state
apparatus (1919-1939); (3)
relative colonial state autonomy
(1940-1952); (4) redefining the
colonial state (1953-1968); (5)
and crisis of the colonial state
and economic restructuring
(1969-1988). Each period is a
relatively discrete con juncture
characterized by one or more of
the following: transformation in
the productive forces, a major
political crisis that confronted
the colonial state, or federal
legislation which altered the
terms of colonial subordination.
The present article will
focus on the later stages of
this process, beginning with
the changes around 1952 and
proceeding up to the present.
By 1952 the colonial state
was neither an instrument of
monopoly capital (as it was
through the 1940s), nor was it
superfluous to monopoly
corporate capital (as it
appeared to be during the
1940s). Rather, the colonial
state was rapidly evolving into
a managerial apparatus that
promoted foreign investments
and harmonized social relations.
The colonial state was widely
perceived as an integrative
institution that harmoniously
and productively fused the
material interests of capital
and the working class. Yet,
these outward changes in the
form of the colonial state, and
the nature of its intervention
in the political economy, did
not represent a substantive
transformation in colonialism.
Through bureaucratic expansion
and centralization, the colonial
state achieved a deeper
presence in civil society. But
it did not internalize and
reflect class divisions and
struggle. It did not serve as
an arena of class conflict
within which the contradictory
interests of labor and capital
were mediated in the interests
of sustaining the capitalist
social formation. The events
of the 1940s and early 50s
revealed that the role of the
colonial state was altered to
promote a new model of
capitalist production, and to
preserve social cohesion and
the legitimacy of colonial rule.
Puerto Rico's relationship to
the United States is defined by
Public Law 600 (PL 600) and
the Puerto Rico Federal
Relations Act it authorized.
The Commonwealth was
established in 1952 and officially
portrayed as a new and
autonomous political entity
which granted the people of
Puerto Rico authority over their
internal affairs. In theory PL
600 permitted the local
authorities to formulate domestic
public policy. Yet it retained
the basic structure and
properties of the colonial state
that were established by
previous Congressional
legislation and Presidential
decrees.
PL 600 was significant
because it created a set of
social institutions and
arrangements that enhanced the
prospects for long term
corporate investments and
profitability. It represented the
culmination of a formal U.S.
effort, in alliance with the PPD,
to reconstitute the insular social
structure of accumulation. 6 One
of the purposes of PL 600 was
to convert the colonial state
into a more efficient institution
for capitalist expansion and
colonial legitimation. Although
the structure of colonial rule
was preserved, the colonial state
was given the requisite
autonomy to devise planning and
social policies consistent with
the requirements of a more
advanced phase of capitalist
development. This phase
differed from the sugar enclave
economy and required a
pronounced and sustained
colonial state role in regulating
social change and class conflict.
The colonial state's post-war
task encompassed both economic
and social functions.
By the late 1960s the
compelling logic that guided
planning was that industriali-
zation would improve social
conditions and generate
material wealth. Capital
inflows, irrespective of their
relationship to local social and
economic needs, would generate
employment and revenue for
the colonial state.
Development was defined as job
creation through rapid
industrialization. By granting
total tax exemptions to new
industries, by assuming many of
the related start up costs, and
by generously subsidizing
industrialization, the colonial
state essentially depleted its
revenues. ? Social justice,
through state intervention, was
not a priority since the
demands on the colonial state
would be reduced through the
90	 emigration of surplus population
and increased public sector
employment. 8
 Planners also
anticipated that an increasing
share of the costs for social
welfare provision would be paid
by the metropolitan
government.
The organic acts tended to
fortify the political and
material conditions of local
elites who supported colonial
rule. Changes in the colonial
arrangement were enacted
either to initiate a transition
to a new mode of production
or during crisis ridden periods
that threatened social
decomposition. Metropolitan
reforms were partially intended
to co-opt potentially defiant
sectors of local capital and
their representatives. PL 600
and the establishment of the
Commonwealth enhanced the
position of local class forces
that sought to advance their
material interests by advocating
closer integration to external
capital. 9 They were given the
opportunity to participate in
colonial rule and to preserve
their material base as a
subordinate actor in an economy
dominated by U.S. capital.
The PPD adroitly promoted
an image as the political
embodiment and protector of the
Island's values and way of life.
During the 1950s and through
the mid-1960s, the PPD-
controlled state devised a social
compact which consisted of
socially progressive legislation
and a developmental ideology.
The developmental ideology
depicted the state as rising
above the material interests of
capital and labor and as engaged
in a process of social
reconstruction for the
realization of collective well
being. Integral to this vision
was the notion that social
equity would be realized under a
state guided program of
externally financed
industrialization. Progressive
social legislation, job creation in
the public sector, and extensive
mediation of industrial labor
relations imparted substance to
the ideology. The PPD, which
enjoyed widespread labor union
support, supervised a lengthy
period of peaceful industrial
labor relations. Although the
distributive policies were not
intended to transform the
structural bases of inequality in
the economy, they did
moderately alter its effects at
the level of consumption and
built support for colonialism.
The post-war structure of
accumulation was notable for a
pattern of consistent colonial
state support for U.S. firms,
remarkably peaceful social class
relations, and long term stability
in the monetary, trade and tax
systems. The Island's
experience was promoted as a
model of peaceful economic
growth based upon solid ties
with the U.S. and respect for
democratic political institutions
and practice. In reality, the
colonial state's role in
regulating social cohesion and
promoting industrialization was
not so benign. It actively
promoted the removal of
surplus population, participated
in programs for the mass
sterilization of women, purged
the organized labor movement
of independence, as well as
nationalist and communist
leadership, and effectively
repressed the Nationalist Party
uprising during the early
1950s.1°
These accomplishments were
short lived, and by the late
1960s the long term stability of
the system was unraveling.
Changes in the class structure,
internal conflicts and
ideological cleavages within the
PPD, signs of the impending
exhaustion of the export
manufacturing model, a rapidly
deteriorating fiscal condition,
and the collapse of harmonious
industrial relations undermined
the post-war growth strategy.
CRISIS OF THE COLONIAL
STATE AND ECONOMIC
RESTRUCTURING: 1969-1988
The post-1968 period can be
divided into two phases. The
initial phase (1969-1976) was
notable for the demise of light
manufacturing industrialization,
the eclipse of PPD hegemony
and the collapse of the social
contract. During this period
pro-statehood forces (Partido
Nuevo Progresista, PNP) were
temporarily able to capitalize
on factional disputes in the
PPD and expose its ideological
and programmatic bankruptcy -
but only to again relinquish
political control to the PPD
once its own agenda for
economic growth and statehood
was invalidated.
By 1976, as its vital
institutional role in the
accumulation process was
eroding, the colonial state was
converted into the intense
object of local political struggle.
Control of the colonial state has
shifted between the PPD and
PNP, and an accumulation model
based on high technology export
oriented firms has been
promoted. Since then the
colonial state has exhibited a
deteriorating capacity to sustain
social cohesion and the
legitimacy of colonial rule.
During the Luis Ferre
administration (1969-1972), labor
intensive industrialization
reached its limits of expansion.
By the end of 1970, the
economy was becoming an
export platform for
pharmaceuticals and other
capital intensive industries. The
changing nature of industrial
development was a result of
increased international
competition in production areas
over which Puerto Rico enjoyed
comparative advantage, and the
associated loss of regional
markets in the U.S. that island-
based industries once dominated.
To counter this decline the
PNP administration accelerated
the transition to higher paying
U.S. firms, relied more heavily
upon the Federal government as
a principal agent for sustaining
local consumption, and tried to
reconstruct the social contract
by acceding to organized labor's
demands. The PNP attempted
to expand its electoral base by
increasing the public sector
labor force. It also built
popular support for statehood
by attributing improvements in
social conditions to a
responsive federal government.
Despite these efforts at
expanding its base, the PNP
lost the 1972 elections to a
reunited PPD.
The PPD regained power on
the eve of a deep recession,
and much of its economic
planning was shaped by the
serious dislocations caused by
the protracted downturn.
Deteriorating conditions led to
an intensified level of political
discord which threatened to
undermine investor confidence
92	 in the state's capacity to
manage the colony. Moreover,
the new colonial managers were
forced to contend with
declining corporate profits,
increased unemployment,
unparalleled labor militancy
which rendered the structure of
industrial labor relations
ineffectual, and a marked
erosion in the fiscal condition
of the state. Because of
deteriorating credit ratings, the
colonial state had difficulty
obtaining capital in the bond
markets to finance the
operation of public
corporations. The PPD faced a
daunting task: to employ the
colonial state's limited powers
to re-establish an
internationally favorable
investment climate for U.S.
capital and to reconstruct the
post-war social contract. But
the colonial constraints, and
extensive reliance on U.S.
credit markets, severely limited
the PPD's scope of policy
options. Such constraints
meant that investor confidence
could only be restored at the
expense of the general
population.
The PPD's industrial
promotion strategy called for
more attractive incentives for
high technology firms; increased
worker productivity and
harmonious labor relations; the
use of fiscal policy to realize
investible surpluses;
modernization of the Island's
institutional and physical
infrastructure; and aggressive
lobbying in Washington for
increased funding. The strategy
was successful to the degree
that it attracted transnational
firms engaged in assembly,
testing and distribution
activities. But the new
industrial structure, firmly
implanted by 1976, required a
direct role for the colonial
state, which, as it shifted
resources to this sector,
intensified the existing social
inequalities. These industries
employed socially inappropriate
technologies, while their net
contribution to state revenues
was minimal. Also, the
aggregate social wage bill
attributable to their operations
was negligible relative to their
profits. They intensively used
infrastructure facilities,
including subsidized energy and
transportation costs, and their
productive activities caused
serious environmental damage.
But the new growth model did
not halt the colonial state's
escalating fiscal crisis, nor did
it reduce unemployment and
labor militancy.
With the outbreak of violent
strikes in critical state run
enterprises and key private
industries, Puerto Rico was an
exceedingly risky investment
location. The PPD's decision to
respond to the crisis by
imposing tight fiscal policies,
including reduced government
services to the population, was
an important factor leading to
its defeat by the statehood
party in 1979. Ironically, while
the PPD advocated increased
autonomy, it relied upon the
federal government to assume a
more visible and intrusive role
in sustaining production and
consumption.
Along with control of the
colonial state in 1977, the PNP
acquired the economic
predicament that had disabled
the PPD. However, it
advocated a different growth
model. It enacted economic
policies and executed a political
program that were intended to
further integrate Puerto Rico
into the metropolitan system
and weaken the Commonwealth
arrangement. While much of
the PNP's work was at the
ideological level, it also
promoted restructuring to
undermine the colonial
foundations of the economy and
fortify Puerto Rico's
dependency on the federal
government. In other words,
while colonialism provided
numerous advantages to
external capital - exemption
from federal taxes and minimum
wage legislation, and limited
federal regulation of industry -
the PNP enacted measures
intended to diminish the
importance of these benefits
for corporate profitability. The
new colonial managers sought
military contracts, increased
reliance on federal subsidies
and a greater federal
bureaucratic presence on the
Island.
While promoting this model
of accumulation, the PNP
proposed that the foreign
corporate sector absorb a more
equitable share of the tax
burden, which was
disproportionately falling on the
middle class. The Industrial
Incentive Act of 1978 was in
part designed to democratize the
tax regime by eliminating total
exemption and gradually phasing
out the tax holidays enjoyed by
foreign capital. By providing
production and investment
incentives and modernizing the
infrastructure, the PNP sought
to attract more pharmaceutical,
electronics and other high tech
firms. These were high profit
firms which could more readily
adopt to the new incentive
programs. Multinational firms
were also encouraged to
establish operations in Puerto
Rico by the benefits they
realized under Section 936 of
the Internal Revenue Code.
Section 936 directly contributed
to the huge profits high
technology firms realized in
their subsidiary operations on
the Island.
The success of the new
economic growth program would
ultimately depend on Congress'
willingness to preserve the
advantages U.S. firms obtained
from colonialism. When
Congress attempted to eliminate
Section 936 in 1982, it
threatened virtual economic
collapse in Puerto Rico. The
Caribbean Basin Economic
Recovery Act was a second
measure which jeopardized the
Island's economy. As originally
formulated the Caribbean Basin
Initiative (CBI) would eradicate
Puerto Rico's preferential access
to U.S. markets. It was
apparent that Congress had the
power to act unilaterally on
Section 936 and CBI, and thus
deal a mortal blow to the
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colony's economy. Only after
a sustained and coordinated
campaign by the PNP
administration and its corporate
allies was Washington
convinced to preserve some of
the Island's tariff, trade and
fiscal benefits. In both
instances the PNP was placed
in the awkward role of
lobbying Congress to retain
privileges that were at heart of
the economic foundations of
colonialism.
The PNP under Romero
regime intensified the
anti-union policies of the PPD
and in particular sought to
confront the well organized and
militant unions in vital
infrastructure industries. The
nature of post-1968 growth
required that the colonial state
provide reliable and affordable
services in communications,
water resources, and
electricity. When major strikes
broke out in these industries,
the PNP acted decisively by
dismissing large numbers of
workers, waging a media
campaign against the unions,
and taking legal action against
the leadership.
The PPD regained power in
1984 and embarked on a
strategy that drew much from
the previous administration.
But in contrast to its earlier
tenure in government
(1973-1976), it began to
examine alternatives to the
traditional industrialization by
invitation approach. Its
current strategy calls for
continued investments by the
most advanced sectors of
capital. But the PPD is also
officially promoting local
capitalist development through
subsidies, financing and
incentives to stimulate the
formation of new high
technology industries in growth
fields. These industries would
be linked to the pharmaceuticals
as suppliers of new technologies
and products for use and further
elaboration by the multinational
firms.
While current economic
planning is decidedly determined
by the accumulation imperatives
of multinational capital, the
technical and managerial class is
divided on which economic
sectors to promote. The
Economic Development
Administration (EDA) continues
to champion direct foreign
investment, irrespective of its
social impact and long term
economic consequences. EDA
maintains an unwavering faith
that Section 936 will not be
rescinded and that Puerto Rico
will retain its role as an export
platform and depository for the
accumulated profits of
multinational firms. The
Governor's Economic Advisory
Council advocates a growth
strategy that is less reliant on
936 corporations. The
committee's technical staff
envisions that Puerto Rico will
emerge as an strategic nucleus
in which diverse multinational
firms can undertake a series of
regionally oriented activities.
While production activities are
important, sustained and more
autonomous growth requires
converting Puerto Rico into a
financial, telecommunications,
distribution, scientific and
technological center in the
Caribbean.
This strategy entails a
further reduction in the colonial
state's role in providing basic
social welfare and services.
Drawing inspiration from
market-oriented policies of the
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neo-conservatives in the U.S.,
the Council advocates the
privatization of numerous
government functions and
services. While it promotes
educational reform, the focus is
on specialized education to
create a scientific and
technical pool of human
resources to service the new
economy. Clearly, the
anticipated growth strategy
ails to address to needs of
the sizeable percentage of the
population that will not
productively participate in the
planned technologically
sophisticated financial, service
and manufacturing economy.
Implicitly, this means a
continued, if not enlarged role
for the federal government in
providing the material and
ideological support to sustain
consumption and preserve social
stability. Social planning is a
secondary component of the
growth strategy. While the
marked division of society into
privileged and relatively poor
sectors is openly recognized,
planners appear to adhere to
the belief in the long term
ability of market forces to
generate acceptable levels of
employment.
This planned transition to a
new phase of capitalist
development requires a more
speculative and direct role for
the colonial state. Its
diversified actions on behalf of
capital includes a role as
venture capitalist to finance
the development of products
and technologies that rationally
exploit local resources. It has
also enacted fiscal policies
designed to channel a
percentage of billions of dollars
on deposit in commercial banks
into local initiatives. And it is
encouraging the repatriation of
resident Puerto Rican capital
held in U.S. banks and financial
instruments. In addition,
legislation has been proposed to
limit corporate profit
remittances and to direct the
accumulated capital into the
formation of globally competitive
local firms.
Economic restructuring is
closely related to a change in
the colonial relationship. A
sector of the PPD argues that
optimal economic conditions can
be realized only if the colonial
state acquires more autonomy
over fiscal policy, international
commercial relations and
immigration policy. According
to this sector, if Puerto Rico is
to be competitive in the global
economy it must have the
capacity to respond quickly to
the changing needs of capital
and must control areas that bear
directly on issues of economic
expansion. This can only be
realized by revising critical
sections of the Puerto Rican
Federal Relations Act. However,
the PPD leadership does not
advocate sweeping changes in
colonial relationship. The
declared goal is to effect minor
changes to enhance local
autonomy in economic decision
making, while retaining those
features of the colonial
relationship that can be used to
sustain Puerto Rico's
attractiveness for foreign
capital.
CONCLUSION
During the last nine decades
Puerto Rico's role in U.S.
economic and geopolitical
spheres has remained remarkably
consistent. The Island continues
to be a major investment site
for metropolitan capital; Puerto
Rican workers continue to be
the source of huge profits
realized by North American
corporations; and the Island
occupies a prominent position
in U.S. regional military
strategy. Despite seemingly
momentous legislation which
appeared to redefine the nature
of Puerto Rico-U.S. relations,
the Island is still an
unincorporated territory with
limited application of the U.S.
Constitution and highly
restricted representation in the
federal government. The
federal government has
gradually conferred limited
powers of self government to
Puerto Rico, but it has done so
without relinquishing its
prerogative to abrogate local
legislation or define the range
of permissible activity.
Prior to 1952 the colonial
state was an apparatus whose
principal managers were
appointed by the federal
government. Alliances between
monopoly sugar firms and their
dependent local elites
guaranteed that the colonial
state would not impede the
sugar industry's operations. By
the 1980s the colonial state
was controlled by popularly
elected managers, yet it
continued to promote the
interests of U.S.-based firms
above local capital. In both
periods, growth and
profitability contributed to
social inequities and were based
on the monopolization of the
principal productive and human
resources by foreign capital.
During the sugar era the
federal government acted
through the colonial apparatus
to promote the objectives of
U.S. firms, often against the
resistance of local propertied
interests. This contrasts with
more recent developments.
During the last 15 years
Congress has acted twice to
eliminate fiscal measures which
generate huge gains to U.S.
multinational firms, but have
resulted in virtually no revenue
for the federal treasury. These
initiatives were aborted only
after an extraordinary campaign
by Puerto Rican leaders, their
Congressional allies and the
multinational lobby. This
episode suggests that while the
federal government is divided on
how to preserve the material
basis of its colonial possession,
the PPD and PNP are committed
to protecting the privileges of
the multinational corporations.
The colonial state's capacity
to respond effectively to the
changing needs and organization
of capital is seriously limited
since it cannot formulate
comprehensive fiscal and
monetary policy. Fiscal policies
adopted by Congress are more
important for the investment
decisions of global corporations
than the tax exemptions and
incentives granted by the
colonial state. Moreover,
changes in the global operation
of capital are undermining
Puerto Rico's traditional position
in the accumulation strategies of
multinational corporations.
These highly mobile and globally
interconnected firms are actively
sought after by many less
developed countries. What
Puerto Rico uniquely offers, in a
politically turbulent and
economically competitive world,
is the monetary stability, access
to metropolitan markets and the
property protection accorded
capital by the federal
government.
Although the colonial state is
losing its ability to influence
corporate investment, it is still
of critical importance for local
political forces and fractions of
domestic capital. It is
incorrect to view the colonial
state as a mere administrative
apparatus for the
implementation of imperialist
initiatives; it is a crucial
vehicle for the material and
political reproduction of these
forces. With the eclipse of
PPD hegemony, ideological
conformity has given way to
alternative popular expectations
on the colonial state's role in
the conduct of political and
economic affairs. But despite
changes in political party
control of the colonial state,
economic and social policy has
been relatively consistent.
During the last two decades
the colonial state has not
altered its role in attracting
U.S.-based capital. The PPD
and PNP continue to employ
public resources to attract and
retain U.S. firms and have
failed to devise rational and
just social policies.
In reality the political
parties are essentially
powerless to effect any
transitions in the domestic
political economy through
control of the colonial state
apparatus. Legal constraints
on public decision making,
external control of dynamic
sectors of the economy, and
the paucity of domestic
opportunities for ownership of
resources all conspire to make
the colonial state irrelevant for
the goals of social equity and
equitable growth. The colonial
state appropriates value from
the domestic economy and
serves as the principal conduit
through which federal monies
are distributed. Given these
realities, political struggles
center around which party can
increase the level of transfer
payments from Washington, or
which can promote increased
foreign investments. Political
parties articulate policies with
respect to maximizing the inflow
of capital and argue that
through increased employment
this wealth will trickle down to
the population. Yet their ability
to effect genuine changes in the
operation of the economy is
determined by colonialism and
by the accumulation needs of
the transnational corporations.
Is there a colonial state in
Puerto Rico? The formal
structure of political rule and
social regulation suggests that a
colonial state does indeed
operate on the Island. Yet is
this an institution of public
power that has been shaped by
domestic class struggle or is it
an extension of the federal
state? The preceding discussion
suggests that over time the
federal government has been
compelled to make adjustments
in the structure of colonial
domination to permit increased
local elite participation in the
operation of the colony. But it
has done so without
relinquishing its prerogative to
unilaterally abrogate local
legislation or to protect the
property rights of capital.
The state in Puerto Rico is a
creation of the federal
government and is expected to
govern the colony in the
interests of the U.S.
Periodically the form of the
colonial state structure has been
altered to enhance regulation of
the local political economy by
political forces who support the
colonial relationship. In the
process the metropolitan state
has, in the interests of
sustaining the legitimacy of
colonial rule, responded to the
demands of local forces for an
increased say in their own
material and political
reproduction.
This article suggests that
Puerto Rico lacks a definable
colonial state. Instead a
colonial state apparatus has
been established and acts as an
exceptional extension of the
metropolitan state. The
colonial state apparatus, in
con junction with federal
agencies, dominates the local
political process. But since it
is an agency of the
metropolitan state, it cannot
serve as an arena of class
struggle because it can neither
alter its form to internalize
working class demands nor
modify production relations to
sustain the material
reproduction of society. Stated
differently, the colonial state
apparatus is prevented from
subordinating the working class
by politically incorporating it
into the governing process,
internalizing its demands and
mediating these demands to
sustain capitalist production
relations. Congress is the
ultimate arbiter of the nature
and structure of the state
apparatus. Rather than serving
as an integrative institution,
the colonial state apparatus
regulates, attempts to impose
harmony and continuously seeks
to reaffirm the legitimacy of
U.S. control of Puerto Rico.
Because of this degree of
dependency, the colonial state
apparatus cannot be the object
of popular struggles. It has
been established and modified
to manage the colony, and is
deprived of the capacity to
effect any changes that impede
the administration of colonial
rule. Popular and class
struggles find expression outside
the institution of the colonial
state apparatus. During the last
ten years popular forces, which
are unattached to political
parties, have emerged in many
localities. They have organized
on environmental, housing, social
justice and a variety of other
critical issues. What is common
is that these popular forces
confront the colonial state
apparatus and the metropolitan
state in order to redress the
social inequities that define
their reality. The political
parties and state apparatus have
virtually no base among these
active social forces.
As we have seen, the
metropolitan state must
periodically intervene in an
effort to sustain the legitimacy
of colonial rule and to contain
challenges to capital. The
implications of this continuous
intervention are that the
reproduction of labor power, as
well as the reproduction of the
colonial state as a material
force, continue to be a function
of the mediations of
metropolitan state in alliance
with capital. With the
accelerated internationalization
of capital and accompanying
transformation of the domestic
class structure, the colonial
state is losing its capacity to
preserve the legitimacy of
colonial rule and respond to the
requirements of capital. It is
this crisis in colonial
management which suggests that
the colonial state apparatus is
an historical artifact incapable
of realizing its delegated task.
And it is this crisis which
underlies the most recent calls
for change in the Island's
colonial status.
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